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flIISImRS SLJRP.ISS tr[vg,!t1g11y INUTSIRIES IN REAPII.IG
trlvlffi.l MARKET BENEFITS
l{AsHrIGrGI, D.c., Decernber 3, L97t -- ortsiders have taken greater ad,-
vantage of the Ccrrnon IWarketrs favorable climate for econcrnic grorth
than have industries insid,e tJ:e Ccnrnr.rrity, according to recent figures
released by tlre Ccrmrission of the European Cqmnnities.
the figures shor+ that Ccrmunity and non-Ccrmnmity enterprises have
profited alike frtnr tlre developnent of a single large econcrnic Lurit.
Yet a closer look at the decade of the sixties reveals Cournnity enter-
prises have been slorer to react to the stirutrlus of the e,xpanded Euro-
pean urarket than many better-equipped and less-inhibited industrial
interests frqn third countries.
Cqmunitv Irdustries StiU Bordgr'Conscious
The restnrcturing of rember statest industries occurs more often hrithin
a nationaL franework tJran a Corururity-w"ide franenrork. Fron 1961 through
1969, there were Lr860 changes in stnrcture (nergers, conglonerate creations,
afid take-overs) within individual Colrnunity courtries, coqlared to only
257 such transactions between industries frm different Connurity cotntries.
Ihe Ocrmtnity also reported 11550 cases of cooperation* between industries
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Oq,"ration agreements,,h this text, include reciprocal buyjng of shares,infomation sharing, standardization, joint researdr and developineni, andjoint use of branch offices.
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in the same country as ccnrpared to 11000 intra-Cqrnunity cooperation
agreernents.
One reason for this trend is the absence of a harmonized conpany
law in the Counr.nity resuLting in lega1 and financial obstacLes to nergers
posed by the individual me,lnber states. Industries try to detour these
obstacLes by signing far-reaching cooperation agreements. This partially
expLains the relatirrely large ntmber of cooperation agreements.
hrpanqimjlhrcnrgh the Creation of, Branch Offices
l&nber state corpanies generally extended their activities to other
Corunurity,contries by setting up branch offices for prodrrction and
distribution. T?rere were 21500 srrctr cases, compared to the 11000 coopera-
tion agreements ar.d 257 stnrctural ctranges mentioned above.
.[lthor.rgh it is t]re most frequent operation, branc]r office creation
increased by only 26 per cent from 1961 to 1969, wtrile Oorrnurity cooperation
agresnents increased by 50 per cent and intra-Cqnrnnrity strr.rctural ctranges
by 84 per cent. Ttrese figures indicate that tlre creation of the Ccrmron
l,larket has, indeed, led to a relatively faster developnent of expansion
tluough cooperation and mergers rather than through ttre establistrnent of
branch offices, a more traditional form of e4pansion.
Third 9omtry Cqryailies Itbre +manic
hnsidering total investnent, third country corpanies appear to be taking
greater advantage of investnent potentj a1 in the Comnon Irlarket than Connnrnity
finns. Belortr are C.omnurity figr:res for the 1961-69 period.:
. CREATISI OF BRA}IGT OFFICES
fror mernber corntry to neniber co.nrtry 21300
frsn tfiird cor-urtry to member corntry 31540
frqn member country to t}ird cotmtry 11158
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MOPENATICN AGREE,IENXS
betweon two nember conrtries
betrveen member comtry and third country
MERGERS AI.ID,TAKE.OI/ERS
frqn merrber cormtry to nernber coultry
frcm nernber colrntry to third cormtry
frqn third country to member country
1,000
2 1790
257
2L5
820
Tttis situation is partially explained by the eagerness of third
country corpanies to locate in a Conmr.mity country in order to junp the
the Crcnnron Market tariff walL. I{creover, certain corpanies, especially
tE coupanies, are more faniliar with large market operation and maintain
a colrpetitive edge over Corum,rrity firms due to tlroir advanced tectrro-
logy and firnncial stryeriority. l,lany firms aLso expand abroad when satu-
rated nationaL markets or anti-tnrst Legislation hapers expansion at
hcme.
Situatiqrs Differ Accorrding to_lrhrfier 0ountry
Scrne @m.urity countries initiate more investnent in other member countries
tlran they receive frcrn other ne,mber countries.
For ocanple, t}re lbtherlands estabLishes L87 companies in tlre Ccnr-
rnnity for every 100 ccnpanies established by member cowrtries in Dutdr
territory. The NetherLands also buys twice as many conrpanies in otiher
nember cornrtries as it seLl.s to its Cotrnmity partners.
Itris is aLso ttre case for Germany, wtrere 100 Conmmity colrpanies
set rp ln German territory are nore tlran ccmpensated by 175 Germany com-
panies established irt ttrc Cqmnity. Moreover, Cermany buys one and a
haLf tines as ruury corpanies in ottrer mernber cor.urtries as it seLls to
other member courtries.
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French investors, hovrever, have boryht sl.ightly fewer coupanies
i1 the Ccmmlnity than menber cotmtry investors harre purchased in France.
Likewise in Belgiun, purchases of Belgian firms by nernber courtry investors
have been twice Ers nunerous as Belgian purchases of nernber country firms.
Purchases of coparries in Italy have been three tines greater than Italian
purchases in meniber countries.
Conparing Conmurity and third courtry reciprocaL investnent patterns,
t-lre balance is negative in all Cormmnrity courtries. For every 100 third
conrtry conpanies set rp in Gernarry, there are only 66 German corpanies
estabLished in third cotmtries.
For tlre ottrer Connunity countries, the ratio of foreign colpanies
in the nerdber state to nernber country cornpanies in foreign nations is:
France, 100 to 33; the lrlettrerlands, 100 to 24; Italy, 100 to 22; Belgirm,
100 to 6. Ttre sane ratio calculated for take-overs is: Germany and tlre
Netherlands, 100 to 40; France, 100 to L7; Belgiun and Italy, 100 to 14.
Ttre rate of Cqnrunity investments in third coturtries (starting fron
a 1ow figure in 1960) increases faster than the rate of foreign imrest-
ment in the 0omnunity. At the present rate, imrestment equiLibritm uilL
not be reaclred before 1985.
Equilibriun between Connn:nity and tXS imrestrnent is impaired by the
fact tlat the Counrwrity, tlre preferred area of [IS investnent, is directing
its e:cpansion and cooperation more toaard Great Britain and developing
cotmtries. 
___,_tE/ Cormnritv InvesUnent Levelq
(in niLLions of dollars) 1960 1970
IE inrrestnent in the Comrunity
Cornnnrity imres0nent in t}re tfrited States
2;208 lf ,695
L,446 3,500
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Counurity figures indicate that ttre Cqunon l,farket is tndergoing
sigrificant cornercial penetration by foreign conpanies while European
industries, for a variety of reasons, have remained relatively urrecep-
tive to inrrestment opportr-nrities offered in their om Ccnmon Market.
The Etrropean conmission, member goverrments, and irdividuals in
the business sector are working to find ways to eliminate renaining obstacles
to intra-Conrnurity investment, especially those r4rtrich increase the cost
of intra-Ccmnlnity mergers and conplicate relations betweerr nain and
branch offices. Other probleurs are the absence of a Corrmlrity conpany
law, exctrarlge rate flrrctuation, and the lack of a European financial
market.
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